Ramblemuse^SM Annotated General Bibliography

Humans, like bacteria, woodchucks, chimpanzees, and other animals, compete or cooperate in order to get food, shelter, territory, and other resources to survive. But how do they decide whether to muscle out or team up with the competition? In “The Survival Game”, David P. Barash synthesizes the newest ideas from psychology, economics, and biology to explore and explain the roots of human strategy. Drawing on game theory-the study of how individuals make decisions-he explores the give-and-take of spouses in determining an evening's plans, the behavior of investors in a market bubble, and the maneuvers of generals on a battlefield alongside the mating and fighting strategies of "less rational" animals. Ultimately, Barash's lively and clear examples shed light on what makes our decisions human, and what we can glean from game theory and the natural world as we negotiate and compete every day.

Presents theories and techniques to "dissect" games of varied structures and formats

Examines games played in clubs, giving case studies for coin and paper-and-pencil games.

Now carefully revised and broken down into four volumes to accommodate newdevelopments, the Second Edition retains the original's wealth of wit and wisdom. In Volume 4, the authors present a Diamond of a find, covering one-player games such as Solitaire.

Explores "partisan" games of infinitely many positions and "loopy" unending and impartial games

Inspired by his experiences as a French military officer and attache in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria, the author realized the "need for a compass" in the suppression of insurgency, and he set out to "define the laws of counterinsurgency warfare, to deduce from them its principles, and to outline the corresponding strategy and tactics. " His book provides an analysis of how to countermine insurgency and the elements that might hinder its defeat. Written in 1964, the book in its new printing is as relevant now as it was 40 years ago-providing a template for the defeat of today's insurgents and terrorists. [Also see the Rand Corp. report at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG478-1/].

4GW (Fourth Generation Warfare) is the only kind of war America has ever lost. And we have done so three times – in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. This form of warfare has also defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria, and the USSR in Afghanistan… As the only Goliath left in the world, we should be worried that the world's Davids have found a sling and stone that work." – Chapter 1, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. The War in Iraq. The War on Terror. These types of "asymmetrical" warfare are the conflicts of the 21st century – and show how difficult it is for the world's remaining superpower to battle insurgents and terrorists who will fight unconventionally in the face of superior military power. This change in military conflict may seem sudden.

This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world's foremost military thinkers--a man generally regarded as the "Clausewitz of the 20th century." Liddell Hart stressed movement, flexibilty, surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns dislocation of the enemy's psychological and physical balance is prelude to victory. This dislocation results from a strategic indirect approach. Reflect for a moment on the results of direct confrontation (trench war in WW I) versus indirect dislocation (Blitzkreig in WW II). Liddell Hart is also tonic for business and political planning: just change the vocabulary and his concepts fit.

This is the exciting and highly literate story of the real Lawrence of Arabia, as written by Lawrence himself, who helped unify Arab factions against the occupying Turkish army, circa World War I. Lawrence has a novelist's eye for detail, a poet's command of the language, an adventurer's heart, a soldier's great story, and his memory and intellect are at least as good as all those. Lawrence describes the famous guerrilla raids, and train bombings you know from the movie, but also tells of the Arab people and politics with great penetration. Moreover, he is witty, always aware of the ethical tightrope that the English walked in the Middle East and always willing to include himself in his own withering insight. [Also see Richard Stiller, 1997: "Influence as Power", http://research.sun.com/techrep/Perspectives/smli_ps-3.pdf]

Strategy is hard. It requires you to step back and see the big picture, when your whole life your were trained on the details. Strategy is frustrating. Even once you manage to get a goal, you spend 90 percent of your energy looking after a thousand niggling details. Strategy is painful, because you are constantly have to choose between what is easy, what is fun, what is satisfying, and what will work. Strategy is unforgiving. The smallest mistake can make your entire plan collapse, even after months of work, and you get no second chances. Strategy is exacting. You have to be hard-nosed about decisions to be made, and you cannot afford to delude yourself about anything. Strategy is complicated. You are always dealing with situations about which you need to know everything, but about which information is very limited. Strategy is demanding. You need to be very analytical about your circumstances, very realistic about your chances, and yet very creative about your core ideas. Is it any wonder no one wants to do it?

A study of national security and military strategy by Col. Chester Richards (USAF Ret. ), suggests that ancient strategic wisdom may help solve the dilemma confronting the U. S. military: spending on defense exceeds that of any combination of potential adversaries, but the services still face cancellation of weapon systems and lack of funds for training, spares, and care and feeding of the troops. Richards suggests U. S. military leaders can break out of the "dollars equals defense" mindset, and create more effective forces. The second edition contains a new forward written in response to the effects that the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States have engendered in the U. S. military.

"Certain to Win" develops the strategy of the late US Air Force Colonel John R. Boyd for the world of business. Robert Coram's monumental biography, "Boyd, the Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War", rekindled interest in this obscure pilot and documented his influence on military matters ranging from the design of the F-15 and F-16 fighters to the planning for Operation Desert Storm to the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Unfortunately Boyd's written legacy, consisting of a single paper and a four-set cycle of briefings, addresses strategy only in war. Boyd did study business. He read everything he could find on the Toyota Production System and came to consider it as an implementation of ideas similar to his own. He took business into account when he formulated the final version of his "OODA loop" and in his last major briefing, "Conceptual Spiral", on science and technology. He read and commented on early versions of this manuscript, but he never wrote on how business could operate more profitably by using his ideas. Other writers and business strategists have taken up the challenge, introducing Boyd's concepts and suggesting applications to business. Keith Hammonds, in the magazine "Fast Company", George Stalk and Tom Hout in "Competing Against Time", and Tom Peters most recently in "Re-imagine!" have described the OODA loop and its effects on competitors.

Thomas Schelling's book The Strategy of Conflict set forth his vision of game theory as a unifying framework for the social sciences. Schelling showed that a party can strengthen its position by overtly worsening its own options, that the capability to retaliate can be more useful than the ability to resist an attack, and that uncertain retaliation is more credible and more efficient than certain retaliation. These insights have proven to be of great relevance for conflict resolution and efforts to avoid war. Schelling's work prompted new developments in game theory and accelerated its use and application throughout the social sciences. Notably, his analysis of strategic commitments has explained a wide range of phenomena, from the competitive strategies of firms to the delegation of political decision power.